A patent troll is an organization that patents state of the art technology which, when widely adopted becomes a lucrative target for litigation.
The second technique involves the transmission of the data in small packets having some form of data reliability monitoring and/or enhancement such as Forward Error Correction (FEC). The length of the packet depends upon the method of data reliability enhancement and the hostility of the environment. Sufficiently small packets overcome the problem of the rapid time change of the channel characteristics.
The third technique is interleaving (to be described hereafter) which is essentially a further data reliability enhancement. This technique improves the performance or many FEC schemes in overcoming the problems caused by nulls in the channel’s frequency response.
So, they combined well known techniques to achieve innovation which is not innovation but obviousness.
“During the course of the development of the IEEE 802.11 TGn Draft, significant Intellectual Property issues have been identified with respect to the TGn Draft.
These issues have not been resolved as of the start of the Sponsor Ballot review process.
The specific issue that causes this particular reviewer to submit a Disapprove vote is the unresolved situation regarding the CSIRO “069” patent and 802.11 TGn.
This issue was first identified to TGn in 2006 and has remained unresolved since.
It is widely known in the industry that CSIRO has refused to provide the LOA required by the IEEE process; and CSIRO has in fact, repudiated a prior LOA filed with IEEE. CSIRO has engaged in active litigation against multiple companies and it is common industry knowledge that CSIRO is demanding royalties of approximately $4/unit.
This voter does not consider that to be a “reasonable” royalty rate.
Silicon implementing 802.11 is commonly sold for $2-$5. $4/unit represents a greater than 100% royalty rate. For an industry segment which sold approximately (depending on whose numbers you prefer) 375M 802.11 chipsets in 2008, that means this is an approximately $1.5B royalty demand, PER YEAR, for the implementation of TGn as contained in Draft 7.
During development of the TGn draft, this IP issue was identified this IP issue to the TGn task group and the task group was asked to take any the following actions to resolve this issue:
1) Revise the draft so that it does not require the use of the CSIRO patented material, or
2) Acquire a legally binding commitment from CSIRO that the patent will be licensed for free wrt to 802.11, or
3) Acquire a legally binding commitment from CSIRO that the patent will not be enforced wrt to 802.11, or
4) Acquire the LOA required by IEEE rules from CSIRO stating that CSIRO will offer RND terms for the patent, or
5) Stop progression of the TGn draft until such time as the situation can be acceptably resolved.
None of these actions was taken by IEEE during the development of the current TGn draft. It is this voter’s belief that at least one of the actions is required under IEEE process rules – however, IEEE has chosen not to take any internal action to resolve this issue.
IEEE’s latest response to WG letter ballot comments (ref exhibit A for details of the comment submitted to the TGn TG as part of WG letter ballot 115) re this issue was:
“Counter: TGn and the 802.11 WG are following the procedures and instructions provided by PatCom regarding this issue.
The TG Chair will forward CID 5038 and CID 5221 via the WG Chair to PatCom for further update/status. PatCom has previously notified the WG chair to instruct the TG to continue until further notice from PatCom.”
While the above may be all the action that the IEEE 802.11 TGn Task Group thinks it can take (given that the TGn task group was instructed to “do nothing” by IEEE Patcom), “waiting for input from PATCOM” neither addresses nor resolves the issue.
Rather, this non-response indicates that while the issue has been identified and discussed at the TG, WG, 802 and IEEE Patcom levels, no action has been taken to resolve the issue.
Unfortunately, IEEE processes do not require provision of an LOA until after the end of the Sponsor Ballot process. In this case the holder of the IP (CSIRO) has informed IEEE that it will not provide an LOA for TGn (see additional information in exhibit A) and IEEE is putting the members of the Sponsor group in the position of being asked to approve a draft standard for which there is a significant royalty cost attached.
Therefore, I am providing this comment as part of the Sponsor ballot process so that other Sponsor ballot group members will be made explicitly aware of the issue.
For additional information, members of the Sponsor group are referred to the attached exhibit which is a comment submitted to the TGn Task group as part of the LB 115 working group ballot on a prior TGn draft.
In view of this situation, my vote for TGn is Disapprove.
David Bagby
President
Calypso Ventures, Inc.
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This could sabotage adoption of Wireless n because IEEE rules forbid standardizing patent-encumbered technology.
In an appeal, the federal judge outlined the case and ordered the matter sent back to have the matter of obviousness revisited:
“ Buffalo’s principal argument on anticipation is based on an article by J.C. Rault and others entitled “The Coded Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (COFDM) 2007-1449 6
Technique, and its Application to Digital Radio Broadcasting Towards Mobile Receivers.” That article, which was published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) in 1989, describes the problems presented by transmitting signals to mobile receiving stations (such as moving vehicles) in a dense
urban area. In particular, the article addresses the dual problems of (1) frequency
variation in signals received by moving vehicles due to the Doppler effect and (2)
multipath propagation of signals “due to multiple reflections by buildings and other scattering structures around the vehicle.” According to the Rault article, those problems could both be addressed by the use of coded orthogonal frequency division mulitiplexing (“COFDM”). That is, the data could be transmitted by interleaving a sequence of short symbol transmissions over multiple channels of different frequencies so that the transmission rate for each symbol could be slow enough to avoid interference from signal reflections, while the transmission rate for the entire multiplexed transmission would still be high enough to be useful for high-speed applications. At the same time, the spacing of the multiplexed sub-channels could be large enough to compensate for
the frequency variations caused by the Doppler effect. The trial court found that Rault disclosed several of the limitations of independent claims 42, 56, and 68–the modulation means, the data reliability enhancement means, and the interleaving means. The district court did not find that Rault anticipated any of
the claims, however, because the court found that Rault failed to disclose the limitation, found in the preamble of each of the independent claims, that referred to the use of the invention “in a confined multipath transmission environment.” The trial court construedthe words “in a confined multipath transmission environment” to mean “in an indoor environment.”
“
I am astonished that the appeal court found that problems involving multiple paths in an outdoor environment were not obvious in an indoor environment. With decisions like that it is obvious that Buffalo had no confidence in a quick and fair ruling in their favour.
So, the prior art was there and the patents were for an obvious combination of prior art published in the literature. Buffalo was likely to win on re-trial so why did they fold? Perhaps they figured a sure deal was better than taking the risk to go back to the same court.
Apparently CSIRO wanted $4 per chip which was selling for less than that.
From the injunction against Buffalo:
“ In 1998, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) contacted CSIRO to request assurance that CSIRO would license its `069 patent to companies wanting to implement the IEEE’s 802.11a standard on reasonable and non-discriminatory (“RAND”) terms once the IEEE approved the 802.11 standard, which pertains to WLANs. CSIRO agreed. In 1999, the IEEE ratified the 802.11a standard, which embodies the core technology invention by CSIRO. The IEEE also ratified the 802.11b standard, which differs from CSIRO’s invention, and was initially adopted by
more companies. In 2003, the IEEE ratified the 802.11g standard, which also embodies CSIRO’s invention. In 2003, CSIRO contacted companies who practiced the `069 patent and began license
agreement discussions. None of the potential licensees accepted CSIRO’s license agreement offer.”
Apparently no one but CSIRO thought the offere was reasonable and on-discriminatory.
This nonsence continues. At least we have some hope of getting rid of the software patents. This re-inventing the wheel stuff is hard to swallow.Are the laws of physics different indoors or out? No. The “invention” was an obvious combination of prior art. I suppose CSIRO has proof that Joe, the plumber, came up with the idea one day while eating a sandwich. Want to bet that CSIRO had some input into adoption of the 802.11 standards?
14 companies have now settled with CSIRO even though Buffalo had its injunction lifted… Buffalo settled. Even though they were right, they fluffed the case with some poor choices in court and decided to pay the troll to continue business.
Here is the letter CSIRO wrote in 1998 promising to provide licences on request for a reasonable and non-discriminatory cost.
Here is the IEEE policy on patents in standards. CSIRO could hold up approval of 802.11n. Thanks a lot.
“IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws on Patents in Standards
6. Patents IEEE standards may include the known use of patent(s), including patent applications, provided the IEEE receives assurance from the patent holder or applicant with respect to patents essential for compliance with both mandatory and optional portions of the standard. This assurance shall be provided without coercion and prior to approval of the standard (or reaffirmation when a patent
becomes known after initial approval of the standard). This assurance shall be a letter that is in the form of either
a) A general disclaimer to the effect that the patentee will not enforce any of its present or future patent(s) whose use would be required to implement the proposed IEEE standard against any person or entity using the patent(s) to comply with the standard or
b) A statement that a license will be made available without compensation or under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination
This assurance shall apply, at a minimum, from the date of the standard’s approval to the date of the standard’s withdrawal and is irrevocable during that period.
“
What can anyone do? The wifi cat is out of the bag. It will not go back in. I suppose alternative technology could be developed but it is easiest to chuck the patent. Will any of these corporations do that after settling? Who knows?